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At a recent festival of Quechua theatre in Peru, one of the plays took as its theme 
the widespread disappearance of people in the Emergency Zones, where the 
state is engaged in what is known as a dirty war with the forces of the 
Communist Part of Peru, better known as Sendero Luminoso. Disappearances 
have occurred over the past two decades in a large number of Latin American 
countries. How does one investigate their cultural effect? For a start, they imply a 
network of threats, silences and other invasions of violence into the web of 
symbolic production. In the play I refer to, the stage is divided into three 
simultaneous spaces: one of them shows a young man being taken away by the 
army; in the second, his family are weeping for the absent son; in the third, the 
dead man himself appears and recounts his experience. Obviously, the 
multiplication of spaces comes out of the need to recompose a divided reality, 
where memory, communication and knowledge have been broken into 
fragments. What is most moving is perhaps the presence of the dead man on the 
stage; the dead, in this circumstance, are memory and without the accumulations 
of memory there is no culture. Clearly, without social memory there can be no 
ethics. Historically the state has presented itself as guarantor of order and 
meaning, offering itself, as Pedro Morandé shows, as coherent body in the face 
of the chaos of discintinuity (Morandé 1987, 95-96). And yet if the state cannot 
exist without its representation of continuities, these are selective, since we find 
states engaged in the deliberate creation of social amnesia.  
These conclusions are obvious, perhaps. But if the debate about cultural studies 
does not confront the question of memory and violence -military, social and 
symbolic - then it will become increasingly nostalgic and irrelevant. A study of 
social amnesia in the shantytowns of Córdoba, Argentina, during the last military 
government shows that memory does not survive without a social space where it 
can be articulated. The inhabitants remembered perfectly well the times before 
1976, but the period of military government was a kind of blank space. The 
reduction of the capacity for memory even affected their personal lives. The 
researchers reached the conclusion that the main cause was the suppression of 
the usual contexts of communication: 'the forms of continuity most affected were 
those connected with people's ways of relating to each other, that is with 
symbolic processes, rather than with modes of economic reproduction . . . people 
did not get together any more, not even to play cards or to talk about football on 
a street corner . . . in the schools, the students were not allowed to have 
meetings or singing sessions during break, on pain of military intevention.' 
Predominantly, though, the amnesia effect owed less to direct state intervention 
than to self-surveillance: '"it was a society which patrolled itself"' (Mata et. al. 
1988, 241-242).  
The two examples given draw attention to a conflict between state and culture, 
not at the level of cultural policy [las políticas culturales] but at the more 
fundamental one of the cultural world and its bases. The term cultural world is the 
one used by Merleau-Ponty to refer to the way in which the composition of 
perceptions into a perceived world depends upon and contributes to a shared 
cultural world( Merleau-Ponty 1989, 23-25, 346-365). In the civil war in Peru, 
both material and cultural bases of Andean life are under threat of destruction, 
and in response the indigenous peasantry are inventing ways of reconstituting 
their unvierse. More precisely, in the Quechua play, it is a question of reinventing 
a space in which to reflect upon experience; without that the cultural field 
becomes simply a network of obediences. Under the Argentine military 
government, the suppression of social memory appears to have been carried out 
with considerable success. Quite probably, opposite examples could be found in 
each country - the aim is not to classify the historical processes. What I would 
like to suggest is that the study of culture needs to ask the question: what are the 
conditions of existence of a given cultural field? And in what ways is the cultural 
field in which we find ourselves currently changing? Clearly these are questions 
that can never fully be answered, especially the second one; but I believe they 
are vital for defining the bases for cultural studies.  
The destruction of symbolic processes is not the exclusive property of states of 
open war. In an analysis of the first year of Carlos Menem's government, Beatriz 
Sarlo has noted that this government imposes 'the idea that politics consists 
merely in the taking of decisions and not in the construction of the alternatives 
within whose limits one chooses'; this diminution of the political sphere 'ends up 
in a government that operates as if it was always having to confront states of 
emergency. That is exactly what happened with the sending of Argentine troops 
to the Gulf.' The neutral, de-ideologising [desideologizante] appearance of the 
decisions hides something else, the imposition of a new rationalisation: 'The 
neutral mask of decisions expresses both that the politics of rationalisation are 
the only possible one and that they are not the product of any ideology.' In the 
final analysis the neutral would be that which is not marked by evaluative codes, 
in other words an apparently non-cultural sphere; the italics are in Sarlo's 
original, reflecting the violence implicit in the obliteration of cultural signs, in 'the 
concealment of evaluative aspects'.  
'The danger of this type of intervention', writes Sarlo as she develops her 
argument, 'is the emptying of the symbolic[vaciamiento simbólico]; once the 
narrative and myths of historical peronism had been deconstructed, they were 
only replaced by the bourgeois novel of market rationalisation, very poor material 
for replacing the political identity which Menemism proposes to dissolve' (Sarlo 
1990, 7-8). That thinning of the texture of politics in which Menem and Fujimori 
(other names could be added, such as Collor) have taken the lead, carries with it 
an undeclared violence: not only against the economic situation of of the millions 
of inhabitants who are not functional for end-of-century capitalism, but also 
against those signs of identity which are not functional either. This violence is as 
legal as the other one of open war, and external war and the use of the methods 
of war within the nation have become interconnected. The connections had 
already appeared in the National Security State, but new dimensions have 
accreted in the past two decades. When Mario Vargas Llosa, whose presidential 
programme has been adopted in broad measure by Fujimori, resorts to external 
and internal war in The Real Life of Alejandro Mayta, he does not do so in order 
to condemn war ethically but to bring about an accelerated reduction of political 
differences. The whole sphere of cultural signs is affected by the debilitation of 
symbols of difference, and this is done not merely with the aim of demonstrating 
the unviability of sodcialist ideology, something he had already attempted in The 
War of the End of the World, but in order to create an ethical and political 
vacuum, only fillable with neo-liberal rationalisation. The Storyteller finishes off 
the job. Political emptyness becomes emptyness of the symbolic. The parody of 
indigenism and anthropology destroys the possibility of any linguistic or cultural 
plurality as constitutive of the nation. In fact the emptying goes further: the 
possibility of there being a repertory of symbols which could be called national 
disappears and there remains a scenario capable of being written only in neo-
liberal language. The question therefore arises, what are the alternatives to 
market rationalisation and the weakening of the symbolic? A provocative solution 
is given by Morandé: if market rationality is not neutral and value free, but 
actually as sacrificial a form of communality as the traditional Christian notions of 
the social, which have had a longer history in Latin America, then why not return 
to the Christian idea? (Morandé 1987, chapters 5,6,10,11)  
Some brief points need making here regarding the debate about the effects of 
the mass media. Until recently, and most often on the basis of the Chilean 
experience of the Pinochet government, it was said that the mass media, given 
their imperialist orientation, were bound to debilitate national cultures. Lately, 
however, there has been increasing recognition that that attitude rested upon the 
supposed passivity of the audience and ideological omnipotence of the media. It 
is therefore becoming accepted that criticism should not be directed at the 
presumed messages in isolation from the larger cultural field, and that it needs to 
consider the media as cultural mediations - mediations of popular memory, to cite 
one instance. When codes of reception are taken into account, the telenovela for 
example can be investigated as an encounter between popular memory and the 
mass imaginary (Martín-Barbero 1987). The question, once again, is that of the 
continuities and discontinuities of the symbolic. If television converts distances 
into simultaneities and floods local spaces with global images, it is also capable 
of reformulating local cultural materials. Of themselves, therefore, the media do 
not give an answer to the problem.  
The emptying of the symbolic field on the one hand, and on the other the 
reinvention of continuities (whether by subaltern or hegemonic groups) can be 
understood within a larger historical context. Crucial among the changes that 
affect the current horizon is the fact that '"the notion of an authentic culture in 
terms of an autonomous and internally coherent universe is no longer viable" 
either in the Third World or the First, "except perhaps as a 'useful fiction' or 
revealing distorsion."'  
The statement is made by Néstor García Canclini in Culturas híbridas: 
estrategias para entrar y salir de la modernidad. (García Canclini, 1990 a). 
Among the effects of cultural hybridism is the fact that 'at the end of the century, 
access to multicultural perspectives is not confined to writers, artists and exiled 
politicians, but is available to people from all social strata.' A vast migratory 
process is occurring and it includes cultural materials as well as human beings; 
you don't have to be a rural Mexican migrant to the USA in order to experience 
the flows which cross frontiers: it's enough to stay at home and turn on the 
television. Hybridisation cuts across any polar opposition between continuity and 
destruction; in this context change as a process requiring chronological 
interpretation is less important than lateral movements, and these are not 
unifiable and require multiple perspectives.  
The word culture itself is affected by these destabilisations. Its traditional 
referent, bound up with the formation of nation-states, is becoming irrelevant: 
'Why go on thinking culture in an etymological sense, as the "cultivation" of a 
territory, when national frontiers become porous, when the disarticulation of both 
urban and peasant forms casts doubt on whether the key to cultural systems can 
be found in the relationship between populations and particular types of territory 
which would generate particular behaviours?' (García Canclini 1990 b, 9) García 
Canclini points to two processes which can help to understand this situation: 
decollection [descolección] and deterritorialisation: 'There was a time when the 
identities of groups were formed through two movements: the occupation of a 
territory and the constitution of collections - of objects, of monuments, of rituals - 
in terms of which the signs distinguishing a group were affirmed and celebrated. 
To have an identity was, above all, to have a country, a city or a neighbourhood, 
an entity within which everything shared by those who inhabited that place 
became identical or interchangeable. Those who did not share the territory and 
therefore did not have the same objects and symbols, the same rituals and 
customs, were the others, the different ones. . . . ¿What is left of that paradigm in 
the epoch of the decentralisation and planetary expansion of big companies, of 
the transnationalisation of communications and of multidirectional migrations?'  
To respond to deterritorialisation without nostalgia can be difficult, but the 
difficulty must be faced. Otherwise, if one fails to grasp the movements of 
deterritorialisation and is drawn into defence of a past which is being destroyed, 
this is no answer to neo-liberal market pragmatism, increasingly dominant in 
Latin America. It becomes difficult to explain cultural continuities except one-
sidedly, in terms of crass inertia and repetition. Take for example the successful 
promotion of the Gulf War as a Just War, a phenomenon which epitomises the 
continuities celebrated by the dominant Western states. It is not enough to say 
that the ideology of Just War goes back to the Crusades and to point to its 
continuities as a theme of Western superiority. It is also nedessary to ask what 
possibilities of redistribution of regional power made necessary its most recent 
resuscitation, and what were the communicative forms of this resuscitation. The 
shifting grounds and forms of inscription need to be analysed, not just the 
context.  
As soon as deterritorialisation occurs, pressures for restabilisation, for 
reterritorialisation also ococur. That is why it is difficult to think within the terms of 
García Canclini's proposition. The pressures for reterritorialisation are immediate 
and simultaneous and often more perceptible that the movement of 
deterritorialisation. Continuities and traditions that occur on the back of 
deterritorialisation are not therefore returns to or of the past, however much they 
may seem that. 'The force and obstinacy of a deterritorialisation can only be 
evaluated through the types of reterritorialisation that represent it; the one is the 
reverse side of the other' (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 316, 258-260).  
If we consider the actions of Sendero Luminoso in these terms, there are ways in 
which the attempt to destroy existing political forces and institutions, although 
carried out in the name of social revolution, could be argued to constitute a form 
of reterritorialisation. This raises a further issue: what deterritorialisation does the 
latter coincide with? The most obvious face of its actions is the use of violence. If 
in some ways this seems merely indiscriminate and excessive, it does on the 
other hand have an exemplifying and codifying function. That is, the cruelty with 
which victims who are members of the local population are treated has two sides. 
There appears to be an attempt to eradicate all cultural signs, leaving mere 
emptyness and silence. Considered as a tactics, this links with the decision not 
only to eliminate the presence of the state in the 'liberated zones' but also that of 
all popular organisations apart from Sendero - to liquidate the officials, the habits 
and the signs of all other organisation. This seems to have been the aim when 
the leaders of the mining unions in the central highlands, a key force in the labour 
movement, were murdered. The other side is the attempt to emplace itself as the 
sole popular organisation: a new authoritarian territorialisation, through which 
Sendero takes on the characteristics of a state. This is accompanied by a lack of 
interest in Quechua culture: Sendero's political programme is concerned only 
with class, not with cultural differences of an ethnic type.  
If the current political violence in the Andean region is accelerating change, the 
question arises how far is it change towards authoritarianism and dogmatism. 
The mixture of rapid change with rigid containment can be traced in the ways 
authoritarian violence has been legitimated. In the first place, Sendero 
substituted an already existing social violence, connected with the structures of 
gamonalismo, in other words with the power relations of precapitalist commercial 
capital. Peasants were able to consider this violence as 'normal', while it could 
also appear to be 'the foundation of a new order' (Manrique 1989, 165). But if at 
first the victims were those peasants who had become part of gamonalista 
structures, 'the category "enemies of the revolution or of the party" would later 
become terrifyingly all-inclusive, referring to anyone who stood in the way of 
Sendero's aims, or who simply refused to collaborate.' The logic shows 
considerable symmetry with the rules for a Just War which were used to draw up 
the notorious Requirement of the sixteenth century. But if an anti-modernising 
violence resting upon a pre-political violence is the most visible feature of this 
war, it nevertheless obscures a massive deterritorialisation of Andean culture 
arising out of the increasing migration of populations and of cultural features. 
This is the 'time of convulsion' explored in José María Arguedas's later novels 
and investigated by the historian Alberto Flores Galindo (Arguedas 1960, 10; 
Flores Galindo 1986, 321-372).  
What is the situation of the academic disciplines in an epoch of migrations and 
hybridism? Clearly, they should not be impervious to the transformations their 
traditional objects are undergoing. One area of difficulty is that the bland 
aggregation of disciplines, which characterises much of what is currently called 
Cultural Studies, is insufficient; disciplinary frontiers tend to get reestablished, 
behind a façade of apparent synthesis. And equally debilitating is the narrow 
range of materials which are actually studied and taught; often, materials which 
cannot be called popular are excluded. One of Andres Bello's great insights, in 
his struggle to assemble a Latin American theory of knowledge, was that if the 
work of analysis is done thoroughly, it then becomes possible to enter a place 
where all truths touch each other. The task is to discover the intersections of the 
different practices of knowledge in order to be able to break down and 
recompose whole cultural fields.  
Cultural criticism, a phrase little heard some five years ago, is becoming a new 
intellectual fashion. But its current acceptance entails the risk that it can be taken 
to be a mere updating of previously existing practices, extended to new objects 
of study. Literary criticism begins to include popular cultures, sociology learns to 
appreciate cultural texts, historians interpret artistic texts. All of this is happening, 
and it is valuable that it should be. But to leave it at that is to run the risk of 
missing out what is most vital: the new importance of cultural analysis does not 
arise simply from changed relationships between disciplines in the intellectual 
field, but from changes which are shaking the bases of sociability, politics and of 
symbolic activity in general. It is becoming increasingly accepted that there is a 
need to rethink the past, present and future of Latin American societies from the 
viewpoint of the cultural field.  
Let us consider, in this light, the characteristics of two traditions of cultural 
criticism that have arisen independently in Argentina and Peru but have some 
interesting similarities. David Viñas's book, Indios, ejército y frontera probes 
those continuities which can be traced between 1879, year when the oligarchic 
republic was consolidated with Buenos Aires as its centre, and the period of 
military government initiated in the latter part of the 1970s. This book documents 
the genocidal treatment of the Indians in the military campaign to push them 
south of the Río Negro, known as the 'Conquest of the Desert', and asks what 
happens when the key historical continuity lies in what has disappeared, in what 
is not said by public discourses but nevertheless permeates the systems of state 
power, regardless of different governments. Viñas traces the shift between a 
fixed and porous frontier based on military forts to a mobile but impermeable 
frontier resting upon the new speed of the 'holy trinity' of the Remington repeater 
rifle, the telegraph and railways; and a further shift to internal and internalised 
frontiers also based in the final analysis on the army ('dieu caché' of Argentine 
history) and their connection with the socio-economic and discursive 
homogenisations imposed as a result of 1879. In the process of this oligarchic 
and ethnocidal modernity, culture becomes, as Viñas puts it, 'ontological', the 
force of the newly imposed national culture seeming natural and immanent, just 
at the moment of massive deterritorialisations. 'And the violence exercised 
against the Indians and their lands turned back and impregnated with all its 
irrationality the foundations of the oligarchic republic' (Viñas 1982, 105).  
Viñas does not locate the continuities implied in this type of statement within a 
Freudian unconscious nor within ideology. But he does not entirely resolve the 
problem of where to situate them. He attempts to facilitate transition between 
material history and the production of meaning by using a vocabulary of relative 
densifications and statifications, made up of terms like 'calcification' and 'colloidal' 
(Viñas 1982, 12). Josefina Ludmer, in El género gauchesco: un tratado sobre la 
patria, is concerned with similar problems, which she extends to include the 
legitimacy of criticism itself. Her text refuses the specialised language of literary 
criticism and allows itself to be permeated both by common speech and by the 
language of state power. It parodies the state's use of legal discourse, especially 
in its dense overcoding and multiple semantic superimpositions, and exposes 
ironically the complicity of literary criticism insofar as its procedures rest upon the 
same enunciative statutes.  
Ludmer formulates a strategy for an interrogation of enunciation (more precisely, 
of the enunciative field) within specific limits, those of the gauchesque genre. She 
analyses the foundational genre of Argentine national literature as a double 
embedding of literature in the organisation of war and civil life, and vice versa. In 
this sense she traces a superimposition of law in the sense of literary code and of 
law as code within the legal system; the whole process allows the penetration of 
the state in literary production and reception and sets up a connective 
stabilisation of epic potential (Ludmer 1988, 236). The major dilemma, given all 
this, is where can criticism speak/write from? What are the alternatives, if it is not 
going to embed itself within the statifications it analyses? Ludmer's approach to 
the problem is ironical, rather than offering a positive alternative.  
There are two stories by Borges that belong to the margins of the gauchesque 
genre and can help reveal its limits and those of Ludmer's study as well. In 'El 
otro duelo', body and code become disconnected: the race between two 
beheaded men, the crass inertia of bodies turned into corpses which still uphold 
the rules of the game, unpeals the code from its material supports. The bodies 
die, the code lives on, grotesquely. In 'Funes el memorioso', infinite, 
undifferentiated recall prevents memory and the story not only places the 
gauchesque at a limit where it collapses Funes is called a 'compadrito' but his 
mentality entirely resists identity - it also challenges all stabilisations, continuities, 
incorporations and overcodings which make the production of a state possible. A 
massive decodification (deterritorialisation) pushes readers not only outside the 
genre but outside any genre and in some ways outside culture itself, placing on 
the agenda the necessity for a renogotiation of cultural fixities in order to escape 
the other stasis, that of extreme decodification, that of Funes's immobilised body.  
Beatriz Sarlo, in her book Una modernidad periférica, Buenos Aires 1920 y 1930, 
seeks to avoid fixities of genre and discourse and defines trhe culture of Buenos 
Aires between 1920 and 1930 as a mixture, not in the sense of a passive 
aggregate of elements, inherited from the past or received from outside, but as 
forms and discourses which become refunctionalised (Sarlo, 1988). The result is 
not single focus but a multiplicity of readings which modify each other mutually. 
Paradigms and ideological frames such as national versus cosmopolitan 
literature are excluded; this type of schematics is replaced by a densification of 
the literary and cultural field, achieved not through the consolidation of law but 
throughan extraordinary richness of writings and readings. Sarlo allows texts and 
not theoretical procedures to define both the field and the methods of criticism. 
The ideal model of her approach, if one can speak in such terms, would be not 
so much the multiple location of the critical voice as allowing it to vary and move 
according to the heterogeneity of the field under study, making use of a fertile 
tension between monograph multiple writings. What is demonstrated is the 
possibility of a plural modern culture, resistant to the homogenisations sought by 
current power systems; and a possible resolution to the incarceration of criticism 
within the institutions and languages of imposed continuity.  
The examples mentioned, to which other names could be added, are 
distinguished among other things by a multidisciplinary openness. In Peru, the 
need to break down discursive frontiers has had a different dynamic, while also 
being response to the current historical conjuncture, in particular the experience 
of violence. 'Sendero Luminoso covers the whole national territory, the 
intellectuals do not', in the words of the Peruvian anthropologist Rodrigo Montoya 
(Montoya 1990). For Montoya, there is an urgent need to achieve an integral 
vision of Peru, beyond existing fragmentations. Among the resources available 
for this task are 1) the tradition of mestizo writing, whose key figures are the Inca 
Garcilaso, Felipe Guaman Poma and José María Arguedas; 2) anthropology as 
the study of marginalised cultures from inside their own autonomy; 3) economics, 
history and sociology for their capacity to discuss society globally. But there is no 
question here of constructing a hierarchical totality: 'there are two ways of seeing 
totality. One, if you retain the metaphor of a building and therefore of the vertical 
structure of society; the other is to do with thinking totality in horizontal terms, 
where economic, cultural and political phenomena would occur in the same 
plane, at the same time and not superimposed like ecological floors within a 
vertical structure' (Montoya 1989).  
For Alberto Flores Galindo, the young Peruvian historian who died recently, it has 
only been possible 'to think and imagine Peru as a totality' since the middle of the 
twentieth century (Flores 1986, 322). The historical changes which have made 
this possible are new mercantile flows, the extension of the road network, 
urbanisation and migrations. Another factor needs adding to thos mentioned by 
Flores; though its relationship with modernity is more ambiguous it is implicit in all 
of his argument: the political violence of the past decade. Its context is the failure 
of the creole state, whose framework has proved incapable of containing current 
social forces or of offering political structures which do not oppress the ethnic 
populations. Montoya invited a group of primary schoolteachers to report on how 
they perceive their identity. One of them asks, 'Am I Peruvian? We really do not 
know why this land is called Peru . . . I personally am a Quechua, I live as a 
Quechua but my heart is not big for this territory which is called Peru because 
this Peru is the property of . . . those who control economic power' (Montoya and 
López 1987, 39). From what place can the creole state be confronted critically, 
given that its ethnocentric (and ethnocidal) bases have penetrated the majority of 
cultural criticism in Peru? In the struggle to create alternative enunciative spaces 
Andean culture has been a key resource. Here is another testimony from 
Montoya's book: 'I am thinking that Peru is no longer ours. The head of Peru is in 
Lima; its mouth forgot its language and doesn't speak it any more because it 
learned antoher "more perfect" one. Its eyes don't know any more how to look at 
the other parts of its body . . Is it that Peru has been cut into pieces? Will it look, 
hear and speak again when the head returns to the body?' (Montoya and López 
1987, 80) The idea of the broken and scattered body articulates an Andean 
mythical substrate, the cycle of Inkarri, a utopian figuration of the Inka. Here once 
again the capacity of the Andean social imagination to recompose a fragmented 
reality and give meaning to experiences is evident. A particular difficulty is to 
grasp this necessary totalisation alongside the cultural hybridisations taking 
place.  
A further problem is whether it might not be impossible to imagine, within the 
terms of Western political reason, a new culturally plural state, not dependent 
upon an ethnically oppressive modernity. One line of thinking passes through a 
reconsideration of magic, taking its direction from the popular re-use of magical 
images and practices in new social contexts. These latter include intersections 
between the experience of generalised violence (economic as well as political) 
and the inadequacy of public languages, of the dominant social imagination, and 
of traditional political formulae. In this scenario, Andean magical beliefs have 
appeared in resemantised forms in the cities. This is the case, for example, of the 
pishtaku (sometimes pronounced pistaco), a figure originating in colonial times. 
The pishtaku beheads human beings in order to extract grease from them. In 
previous periods the grease was said to be used for casting bells and 
manufacturing candles; in the nineteenth century, for locomotives; in the nineteen 
sixties, for the NASA space programme. But in 1987 pishtakus appeared in 
Huamanga, a city flooded by migrants escaping from the violence the armed 
forces or Sendero. They wore yellow raincoats and carried machine guns, 
machetes and an identity card provided by the President of the Republic. The 
grease extracted by them was sent away for the manufacture of medicines and 
beauty products, and the profit obtained would be used for paying the foreign 
debt. But, as Isbell has pointed out, for peasants in some parts of Ayacucho, the 
pishtaku (known there as ñakak) is believed to carry off fat in order to 'feed the 
Sendero army on the flesh of peasants' (Isbell, 1991). The pishtaku is an 
obviously vampiric figure whose magic is far from being a merely archaic and 
folkloric nostalgia; on the contrary, it can be used for diagnosing capitalist 
modernity. Moreover, the symbolic effectiveness of the pishtaku cannot be 
interpreted from the viewpoint of the social and economic rationality subscribed 
to by the dominant groups, the educational system and even the majority of 
intellectuals. It implies a society of colonial social relationships, an ethnic rather 
than a class logic and a magical not an instrumental rationality.  
When pishtakus began to appear in Lima in 1988, metamorphosed into a group 
of gringo doctors with assistants wearing white coats who went through the 
shantytowns kidnapping children and removing their eyes for transplants, a 
debate arose as to whether the eye-stealers (saca-ojos) could be interpreted as 
a regression to ethnic as opposed to class identities. According to this viewpoint, 
the transition from ethnic to class identities, a precondition for the creation of a 
genuinely national society, had been interrupted by Sendero, and was causing 
the social fabric to collapse and bringing about a return to local and ethnic 
identities. The opposing argument maintained that if the renunciation of ethnic 
identities was necessary for modernity, then this was an ethnocidal modernity. If 
such widespread magical perceptions are responses to an emptying of the 
symbolic field, do they also imply a return to premodern identities, do they 
indicate a possible resource for an alternative rationality, or are they simply 
projections of an anxiety which can find no other outlet? The answer is not yet 
known; but it is also clear that the question can only be pursued from a new 
attitude to the cultural field.  
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